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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study was to assess the impact of the energy
crisis on the petroleum industry in North Dakota.

Because of the complex

structure of the industry, particular attention was focused on the
unbranded dealers who sell gasoline in the state.
A questionnaire, which was mailed to members of the North Dakota
Retail Gasoline Dealers' Association, was designed to elicit responses
as to the severity of the energy crisis.

The questionnaire was followed

up by numerous personal interviews and telephone calls directed mainly
at those dealers who are no longer in business.

Finally, research was

conducted to determine the marketing strength of branded and unbranded
dealers in the state.
It was discovered that since 1965 tne small unbranded dealers
in the state have gradually lost their market share of gasoline, and
that this weakening market position was accelerated during the energy
crisis when a substantial number of small unbranded dealers were forced
out of business.

Although the large unbranded dealers have experienced

financial difficulties because of their limited access to the cheaper,
domestic crude oil, they have remained in the market place and have
managed to maintain their market share of gasoline, primarily because
of the federal allocations program.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
In October, 1973, the United States was confronted with an oil
embargo by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).
Sporadic shortages of petroleum products had occurred in 1972, but
with the embargo the shortage became more severe.

Consumers suffered

shortages of petroleum products, endured the aggravation of long
lines at the gas pumps and finally received the ultimate blow in the
form of rapidly increasing prices.

While consumers chafed, the indepen

dent retailers in the petroleum industry faced an even graver situa
tion.

They were gradually and inexorably being forced out of the

market place.

To compound the problem, from 1972 to 1974 the major

oil companies reported dramatic increases in profits that evoked out
rage from almost every segment of society.
The present concern over the increasing economic power of the
petroleum industry surfaced forcefully in response to rapidly escalat
ing prices and substantial increases in oil profits.

Consumers were

unwilling to accept the argument that the profit picture, when examined
over a period of years, was not excessive.
For years the petroleum industry looked to crude oil as the
source of most of its profits.

Retailing, a necessary outlet in the

structural chain, was set up as a vast complex of expensive outlets
located on every major street corner in the country, operating on a
1

2

low volume, low price basis.

Gas wars flourished without regard to

profit or return on investment.
Somehow, within this environment, the independent retailers
managed to survive and gradually expand their market share of gasoline.
By purchasing the cheaper surplus of the majors and operating on a
low cost-high volume basis, the independents moved aggressively against
the majors who were encumbered with expensive stations, repair services
and higher cost gasoline.
Just as the marketing structure began to buckle under the com
petitive pressures of the independents, shortages of petroleum products
began to appear.

With the shortages the spot market in petroleum pro

ducts dried up.

The cheap, accessible supply of gasoline was no longer

forthcoming; and because many of the independents were not tied to
suppliers by contractual agreements, their positions became precarious.
Within a short time the dynamism generated by the independent
retailers floundered as more and more of them were forced out of busi
ness.

As shortages of petroleum products grew more acute, it appeared

that the independent retailers could not survive without fast and effec
tive government intervention.
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to assess the position of the
independent marketers in North Dakota from 1965 to 1974 and to deter
mine the extent to which the “energy crisis" affected their position.
Until the onset of shortages in the winter of 1972 the independent
retailers in the United States were the most competitive and the most
successful group of independents in the oil industry.

In fact it has
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been alleged that the energy shortage was actually contrived by the
major oil companies to drive the independents, and particularly the
independent retailers, out of business.

Allegations aside, there is

no doubt that since 1972 the independent retailer has been forced out
of business at a rapid rate.

The focus of this study has been to

determine whether the independent marketers in North Dakota have been
similarly affected.
Procedure
To assess the impact of the energy crisis on retail outlets in
North Dakota, a questionnaire was prepared and distributed by the North
Dakota Retail Gasoline Dealers Association of Bismarck, ND.

Because

no lists of retail gasoline dealers were readily available and sheer
volume of retail stations dictated against compiling one, attention
was turned to the bulk oil dealers in the state.

Since the bulk oil

dealers supply all retail outlets with petroleum products, any economic
change affecting these dealers would quickly impact upon their retail
customers and give a good indication of the health of this sector.
The Motor Fuel Tax Division of the State Tax Department in Bismarck,
ND, which collects a seven cent tax on every gallon of gasoline sold
at a retail outlet, provided such a list.

This list, along with data

from the ledgers, invoices and bills of lading of the Motor Fuel Tax
Department, provided useful information on the buying patterns arid
marketing problems of many of

',0 independents.

The State Laboratories Department and the Planning and Research
Division of the State Highway Department, Bismarck, ND also provided
invaluable information on the volume of sales of gasoline, heating

4

oil, kerosene and other products.

To round out the study, more than

one hundred contacts were made through personal interviews, telephone
calls and the distribution of a questionnaire.
Limitations of the Study
The petroleum industry is generally described under the follow
ing headings:

production, transportation, refining and marketing.

The purpose of this study is to assess only the marketing sector of
the industry within North Dakota; and within this sector the main
emphasis has been on the bulk oil dealers.
Although much empirical data was collected, the results required
some interpretation.

CHAPTER II

THE SHORTAGE OF OIL:

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

The Market for Petroleum
An accelerating demand for oil coupled with decreasing domestic
production created a shortage of product in the U. S. that was filled
at a rapidly increasing rate by foreign oil imported mainly from OPEC.
However, this growing dependence on foreign oil created little interest
in the country until the trauma of an oil embargo by OPEC in October,
1973, and the subsequent rapid increases in the price of oil shocked
the nation into a more critical examination of its energy position.1
Somehow our galloping increases in consumption had gone unnoticed,2
yet the exploding demand was very apparent.

Since 1960 our energy con

sumption increased by approximately 70 percent while consumption of crude
petroleum almost doubled.

During this same time our imports, which were

mainly from the OPEC nations, tripled, as shown in Tables 1 and 2.
Certainly the surge in demand for energy since 1968 was some
what unexpected.

Growth prior to that time had been a relatively stable

three percent per year, then jumped significantly to over six percent

^For earlier appraisals of our energy position, see U.S., Congress,
Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, A Review of Energy
Policy Activities of the 92d Congress, First Session, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess., 1972, pp. 158-169; Lawrence A. Mayer, "Why the U.S. Is In An
Energy Crisis," Horizon (November, 1970): 75-77.
2u. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical
Abstract of the United States, 1974, pp. 516-517.
5

6

per year in 1968.

The reasons for the increase were varied.

The real

price of energy fell steadily throughout the 1950s and 1960s,3* and in
response to falling prices consumers reacted predictably by increasing
their consumption.

This increase in quantity demanded was further stim

ulated by an ever rising standard of living which encouraged the purchse
of numerous energy consuming products--motor boats, stereos, dishwashers,
additional cars and even air conditioning.

As well, many of the environ

mental regulations imposed on industries, notably the automobile industry,
required the installation of emission devices that required increasing
amounts of energy.4
Despite burgeoning demands for energy after 1968, there was little
response on the part of the oil industry to supply these rapidly expand
ing wants.

To the contrary, domestic production of crude petroleum

rose from 33.2 trillion British Thermal Units in 1950 to a peak of 35.3
trillion British Thermal Units in 1960, only to decline slowly there
after.56 The number of producing oil wells showed a similar trend while
the number of oil wells successfully completed during a year fell from
24,000 in 1950 to 11,000 in 1972.5

Production, which was clearly on the

downswing, owed its decline to varying forces.

^Edward J. Mitchell, U. S. Energy Policy: A Primer (Washington,
D.C: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research; 1974),
pp. 11-13.
^Joseph J. Seneca and Michael K. Taussig, Environmental Economics
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974), pp. 162-163.
5U. S., Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract, p. 514.
6 1bid., p. 670.
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Environmental factors adversely affected the oil industry by
hampering or prohibiting expansion.

The furor generated by many groups

over the detrimental environmental impact of the Alaskan pipeline effec
tively delayed its construction and caused such companies as Atlantic
Richfield to lose as much as one million dollars a day.78 Similar costly
delays and increasingly expensive demands by environmentalists may have
seriously curtailed much off shore drilling, as well.^
In the 1930s the oil producing states, recognizing the finite
character of their most valuable resource, passed pro-rationing legisla
tion that set forth optimum conditions for maximizing output in the long
run.

Pro-rationing, a device to limit production in the short run, was

justified by some on the grounds that it created more favorable geologi
cal conditions for recovering less accessible crude oil over the long
run.

However, this has been disputed and the actual basis for pro

rationing may have been that by restricting supply oil producers benefited
from increased prices and profits.9
When the United States lost its self sufficiency in oil in the
early 1950s, it became necessary to import increasing quantities of oil.10
7

U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Fair Marketing of
Petroleum Products Act, Hearings before the Consumer Subcommittee of the
Committee on Commerce on S.Res. 1723, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 1973, p. 168.
8Ibid., p. 121.
Q

Mitchell, U. S. Energy Pol icy, pp. 29-30; U. S., Congress, House,
Committee on Government Operations, Investigation of the Petroleum
Industry, Hearings before a Permanent Subcommittee on investigations of
the Committee on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 1973”,
pp. 15-16.
^°U. S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract, p. 516.
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TABLE 1
ENERGY CONSUMPTION AND REQUIREMENTS
TOTAL AND PER CAPITA: 1940 TO 1973*

ALL 1
ENERGY

NATURAL GAS

COAL

CRUDE
PETROLEUM

YEAR

TOTAL

PER
CAPITA

TOTAL

1940

23,908

181

2,726

21

12,535

95

7,487

57

1945

31,545

238

3,973

30

15,972

121

9,619

73

1950

34,153

226

6,140

41

12,913

85

12,706

84

1955

39,956

243

9,232

56

11,703

71

16,328

99

1960

44,816

249

12,736

71

10,414

58

18,608

103

1965

53,969

278

16,097

83

12,358

64

21,566

111

1970

67,143

330

22,029

108

12,698

62

29,537

145

1971

68,698

338

22,819

111

12,043

58

30,570

148

1972

72,108

346

23,125

111

12,495

60

32,965

158

1973

75,561

360

23,558

112

13,520

64

34,680

165

PER
CAPITA

TOTAL

PER
CAPITA

TOTAL

PER
CAPITA

*Total in trill ions, per capita in millions, of British Thermal Units.
SOURCE'All. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1974, p . 516.
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TABLE 2
CRUDE OIL IMPORTS INTO THE U.S. BY COUNTRY iOF ORIGIN:
COUNTRY
Total From
All Countries
Canada
Boli via
Columbia

I960I TO 19731

1960 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973

372

452

447

412 *472 *514 *483 *613 *811 1,184

41

108

127

150 *169 *203 *245 *263 *312

-

-

1

7

365

7

6

1

1

-

1
T

15

15

14

12

12

16

7

3

2

Venezuela

173

158

147

131

126

112

98

111

93

126

Algeria

(z)

3

1

1

2

(z)

2

5

32

44

Egypt

1

1

1

1

11

15

8

7

3

5

Libya

-

15

25

15

42

49

17

19

40

49

Nigeria

-

5

4

1

3

18

17

35

89

164

United Arab Emirates

-

5

5

2

6

5

23

29

27

26

Iran

13

29

31

24

21

15

12

39

50

79

Kuwait

48

20

10

7

16

13

12

11

13

15

Saudi Arabia

28

48

46

30

19

13

15

42

64

169

Indonesia

27

22

18

23

27

32

26

40

60

73

5

5

2

6

5

23

29

27

26

Abu Dhabi

-

- Represents zero, "z" Less than 500,000, * Includes some Athabasca
hydra-carbons
^In millions of 42-gallon barrels.
SOURCE: U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1974, p. 516.
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But even this source was not to yield an unlimited supply.

In 1957 a

system of voluntary import controls was introduced only to be replaced
in 1959 by mandatory controls.^
Finally, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 which reduced the oil deple
tion allowance from 27% percent to 22% percent helped discourage new
investment in the oil industry.

Quite predictably then, a rapidly rising

demand for oil interacting with a decreasing supply of product ultimately
led to an increase in price that literally burst forth upon a society
ill prepared to receive it.
Role of the Independent
In order to evaluate the position of the independent in the
petroleum industry today, it is first necessary to examine the structure
of the industry and to assess the role of the major oil companies within
this framework.

The functions of the petroleum industry may be classi

fied in the following manner:

(1) exploration and drilling, (2) produc

tion, (3) transportation, (4) refining and (5) marketing, although fre
quently the first category is omitted in any industry breakdown.

The

important fact is that a fully integrated company is engaged in all of
these operations.

For an assessment of the import quotas see U. S., Congress,
House, Select Committee on Special Small Business.
Inadequacy of
Petroleum Supplies and Its Repercussions on Small Business, Hearings
before the subcommittee of the House Committee on Small Business H.R. 5
and 19, 92d Cong., 2d sess., 1972, pp. 1-3; U. S., Congress, Senate,
Energy, pp. 26-32; Robert Wales, Report on the Competitive Position of
North Dakota Crude Oil in the Minnesota Market (Grand Forks, ND: Bureau
of Business and Economic Research, University of North Dakota [1965],
pp. 2-3.

n
Although the number of oil producers in the U. S. has been esti
mated to be between 10,000 and 12,000 the top eight oil companies [Mobil,
Texaco, Standard of Indiana, Standard of California, Exxon, Gulf,
Atlantic Richfield and Shell] accounted for 43 percent of the crude
oil produced in 1960 and 51 percent in 1969J2

Considering that these

same top companies also owned approximately 64 percent of the domestic
crude proven reserves, this increasing concentration in production
seemed almost inevitable.^

Moreover, it has been further enhanced by

the state pro-rationing system outlined earlier.

Even the import quotas

introduced in the 1950s did not weaken this control perceptibly.

Since

only existing refineries were allowed to import the cheaper foreign
crude oil, which varied from $1.25 to $1.50 a barrel below domestic
crude, and since refineries could only import a percent based on their
domestic output, the top eight companies received the bulk of the cheaper
foreign crude.^

Thus, the supply of crude oil, domestic and foreign

was largely controlled by the major integrated oil companies.
Further benefits accrued to integrated oil companies in the form
of the tax depletion allowance on crude oil.

Because this allowance was

a function of gross income from sales of crude oil, the larger the gross
income the greater the tax benefit.

Clearly, then, it was beneficial for

integrated firms to charge a high price for crude oil
17

’.hereby ensuring*
3
1

U. S., Congress, House, Petroleum Industry, pp. 12-13.

131bid., p. 13.
^ W a l e s , Minnesota Market, pp. 2-3; U. S . , Congress, House,
Small Business, pp. 1-10.
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a high gross income at this industry level.^

Since refinery profits

were not subject to the depletion allowance they were kept low and as
much profit as possible was shifted back to crude oil production.

This,

of course, ensured that the profit margin on crude oil production was
substantially greater than the return on refining.

Moreover, the effect

of this upstream shift of profits has been to put a price squeeze on
those refiners without oil wells.
Additional dividends accrued to the major integrated oil companies
in the form of legal transportation rebates.

Once the crude oil was

recovered it was transported from the fields to a trunkline station.
From there the oil was directed to its sources through a complex, intri
cate and expensive network of pipelines branching across the country.
This crossing of state lines automatically invited the regulatory super
vision of the Interstate Commerce Commission; however, their jurisdiction
has been nominal since oil companies were allowed to transport their oil
in their own pipelines.

Since they received dividends from the subsid

iary pipeline company the cost of transportation became a bookkeeping
entry rather than a significant factor in the cost of production.^

This

lucrative arrangement evolved after the U. S. entered World War II.
Because of the critical need for an uninterrupted supply of oil, the
government and major oil companies drew up an agreement whereby the
shipper-owners of pipelines could receive "dividends" up to 70 percent
of a pipeline's "valuation."

The term "valuation" has never been clearly

15U. S . , Congress, House, Petroleum Industry, pp. 32-37, pp. 60-62.

16 Ibid., p. 26.
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d e fin e d . ^

A legal agreement with the government, therefore prevented

any antitrust action against the major companies; instead, they effec
tively secured rebates in the face of the Elkins Act of 1903 which legis
lated against this very action.
Forced to rely on the major oil companies for transportation,
independent producers have encountered numerous difficulties in attempt
ing to use the pipelines.

As a result they have frequently sold their

crude oil at the wellhead, instead.

The top eight firms have purchased

approximately 40 percent of the crude produced by independents while
other majors have purchased more than 25 percent.

18

Not surprisingly, the top eight crude producers in the country
are also the top eight r e f in e r s . ^

In the last twenty years they have

been subjected to very limited competition in the form of new independent
refiners.

The high capital outlay required to build a refinery coupled

with a dependence on major oil companies to supply and transport crude
oil rather convincingly dictates against independent investment in this

area.20

Furthermore, foreign sources of oil are precarious since it

has been estimated that the eight companies are producing over 80 percent*
9
8
1

^James E. Inman, "A Contrived Oil Shortage?" Atlanta Economic
Review (November-Oecember 1974), 21.
18

U. S., Congress, House, Petroleum Industry, p. 26.

191bid., pp. 17-21.
on

U. S., Congress, Senate, Fair Marketing, p. 227; U. S., Congress,
House, Small Business, p. 13.
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of the world's crude.^

Perhaps of even greater significance has

been the uncertainty generated by governments--at home, as well as
abroad.

Neither has been reassuringly consistent in its policies; in

fact, the clout wielded by the OPEC countries has created much instabil
ity and uncertainty for potential investors.
Finally, profit--the magnet that attracts new investment--has
been almost neutralized by the pricing practices of major firms which
ensure that refining profits remain low.

The result has been that in

spite of increasing demands for oil (demand for gasoline almost doubled
from 1968-19 73)2 2 there have been virtually no new independent refiners
in the field.

The financial barrier has been a dissuading factor to

potential investors, but even if this hurdle is overcome, the unavoid
able reliance on major oil companies for sources of crude oil and trans
portation facilities have presented even greater problems.

When low

refinery profits are added to the mix of economic calculations the
prognosis for further expansion by the independent refiners has gener
ally been bleak.

Ultimately, then, retail marketing of petroleum pro

ducts remains the most competitive portion of the industry, and within
this sector gasoline marketing is the most competitive;23 but the inde
pendent retailers face formidable problems.
21

John M. Blair, "The Implementation of Oligopolistic Interdepen
dence International Oil: A Case Study," paper presented before the
Association for Evolutionary Economics, San Francisco, CA, 29 Dec.,
1974.
22

U. S., Congress, House, Petroleum Industry, p. 1.

23 Ibid. , pp. 21-23.
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The top eight companies sold approximately 55 percent of the
gasoline in the country in 1971 and in the eastern and gulf regions of
the U.S., where almost 50 percent of all gasoline is conr med, these
same refiners have more than 55 percent of the refinery capacity.^
In addition, the majors exercise substantial control over the supply of
crude oil.
A statement by James Halverson, Director of the Bureau of Comnetition of the Federal Trade Commission before the Senate Committee on
Commerce, yielded the following information:

a preliminary analysis of

i survey conducted during a broad scale investigation into competitive
problems of the petroleum industry indicated t' at independent gasoline
marketers received only about two percent of their supply from the
light largest oil companies.

Consequently, the independent marketers

lave been forced to rely on the smaller integrated companies and inde
pendent refiners.

But the major integrated oil companies have provided

;he most crude oil for them and thus have been vitally important to the
wall refiners as well as other independent marketers.25

As a result,

any reluctance on the part of the majors to furnish crude to the smaller
majors adversely affected all independents down the line.
In spite of formidable obstacles,26 independents have been a
strong competitive force in gasoline retailing.

As well as providing2
*
5
4

24Ibid., pp. 50-57.
25

Ibid., pp. 8-10; U. S., Congress, Senate, Energy, p. 48.

2°ib1d., pp. 24-27; U. S., Congress, Senate, Fair Marketing,
pp. 21-43.
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additional consumer choice, they have been leading innovators of market
ing concepts in the industry which have included competitive pricing
and self-service g a s o l i n e . Operating on a high volume-low profit mar
gin, the independent retailers increased their market share substantially
during the 1960s and early 1970s.2^
During the last several years, the independents have sold gasoline
for three cents to five cents per gallon less than the prevailing price
of major brands.

As a result, they saved the public an estimated $375

million in 1972 and well over half a billion dollars if the restraining
force on even higher prices by the majors is considered.

But this price

advantage of independents has been tied to purchases of surplus gasoline
from the majors, which has been offered at discount prices.
As the supply of surplus gasoline diminished, the independent
dealer lost his competitive edge.2
293
*
7
0 By the summer of 1972.the adminis
tration recognized the seriousness of the widening gap between demand
for and supply of petroleum products, but their limited e f forts™ to
overcome the problem were met with resistance.

At that time the major

oil companies recommended that import controls should be maintained
27

U. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, The Gasoline and
Fuel Oil Shortage, Hearings before the subcommittee on Consumer
Economics of the Joint Economic Committee, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 1972,
pp. 43-44.
no

"The Oil Giants Fight the Independents," Business Week, 13 May
1972, op. 135-144. U. S., Congress, House, Petroleum Industry, p. 57,
pp. 135-144.
29
30

U. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Shortage, p. 44.
U. S., Congress, Senate, Energy, pp. 7-20.
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and that refined products should not be imported.

They also stated

that refinery capacity would be adequate to meet all demands for
petroleum products over the next two years.31

The administration was

convinced, and made no serious effort to address the forthcoming
problem.

The ensuing shortages of petroleum products that followed

during the fall and winter of 1972-73 reverberated across the nation,
affecting every sector of the economy; and within the petroleum indus
try, the independent, unbranded retailer experienced the greatest hard
ships.32

Finally Congress responded.

To assist all independents and

to maintain a viable independent sector in the petroleum industry, a
voluntary oil allocation program was set up.
The Oil Shortage of 1973
The voluntary oil allocation program instituted on May 10, 1973
was administered by the Office of Oil and Gas in the Department of the
Interior.

Under this program each refiner, marketer, jobber and dis

tributor was asked to make available in each state to each of its cus
tomers, including those purchasers in the spot market, the same per
cent of its total supply of crude oil and products that it provided
during a designated base period.

Special consideration was given to

priority users such as farmers and health and emergency services.

Price

guidelines were outlined for those special users.33
In a further attempt to ensure an ample supply of petroleum pro
ducts, President Nixon removed import controls on May 23, 1973.
31

U. S., Congress, House, Petroleum Industry, p.v.

32U. S., Congress, Senate, Fair Marketing, pp. 1-74.
331bid., pp. 135.

The Oil
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Import Appeals Board policies were also changed to make more crude oil
and products available to independents, by issuing fee exempt import
licenses.

The Board, moreover, actively assisted independent refineries

and marketers in obtaining an adequate supply of petroleum products.
The government also entered the supply picture by allocating royalty
oil from federal lands to crude-short refiners in lieu of collecting
cash.34
The problems of adequate supply were further complicated by
demands for "quality" supply.

The air quality standards of several

Eastern states necessitated that refineries use sweet, or low sulphur,
crude rather than high sulphur c r u d e . These environmental regulations
diverted sweet crude to the major companies on the east coast and away
from inland, indepe ident r e f in e r ie s . 36
In spite of many efforts to maintain a healthy independent sector
in the oil industry during the OPEC embargo the mortality rate rose
alarmingly.

The Office of Energy Preparedness reported that a minimum

of 882 stations were forced to close in a three and a half month period
ending May 30, 1973 and another 1,863 were threatened with closing
because of a shortage of gasoline.3
37
6
3
*
4

While independent retailers

341bid., pp. 135-136.
or

For a description of the physical composition of crude oil,
see Wales, Minnesota Marketing, pp. 11-16.
36

For more detailed information on the supply problems of inde
pendent terminal operators and refiners, see U. S., Congress, House,
Small Business, pp. 6-9; Wales, Minnesota Marketing, pp. 2-4.
37U. S., Congress, Senate, Fair Marketing, p. 209. For addi
tional information see U. S., Congress, House, Petroleum Industry, p. 1.
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suffered acute shortages, the majors took care of their own dealers and
even seemed to have arranged to share the markets with other major dealers.
Phillips abandoned its retail outlets in New England; Gulf reportedly sold
3,500 stations in the Midwest; Atlantic Richfield left the southeastern
gulf area and American Oil left the West Coast.3^

The independent dealers

saw their market share of gasoline slip from 28 percent of the total
national consumption in 1972 to 18 percent in 1974.3
394
8
0
In the face of mounting evidence that independent dealers could
not survive even with the voluntary allocation program, and confronted
with an oil embargo by OPEC, the allocations program became mandatory
on January 15, 1974.^
The prime purpose of the program was to allocate the st rtages in
the nation equitably.

In pursuit of this goal, William E

5 imon,

Federal Energy Office Administrator, directed the red4stribution of gaso
line from states of relative surplus to those of

ritically short supply

so that no one section of the country was unduly affected with the ensuing
hardships that shortages inevitably create; but the program was also
designed to help the independent segment of the oil industry.

These inde

pendents had survived profitably by purchasing the cheaper surplus crude
of the majors.
38
39
40

Once this source dried up, the scramble for petroleum

U. S . , Congress, House, Petroleum Industry, pp. vi-vii, pp. 40-42.
Moneysworth, New York Times News Service, 20 January, 1975, p. 1.

U. S. President Proclamation,"Republication of Certain Regula
tions," fed^r^J_Regj2teil 39> no. 191> 1 October, 1974.
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products became intense.

Because many of the independents did not have

contractual ties with the majors, their position became even more tenu
ous.
The large integrated companies argued that in a situation of tight
supply their prime obligations rested with their own dealers and the
independents would have to wait for these contractual obligations to be
fulfilled before their requests were considered.

The effect was that

the unstable, unpredictable and inadequate supply of petroleum products
forced many independents out of business.
The allocations program did at least ensure the independents of
receiving some supply of petroleum products.

Unfortunately, a two

tiered pricing arrangement in the oil industry pushed them from one uncom
petitive corner to another.

The,price differential has been a direct

result of the government intervention.

In an attempt to stimulate pro

duction, the government freed from price controls all newly discovered
oil, a matching amount of old oil and the output of numerous smaller
wells producing less than ten barrels a day.
Representing about 40 percent of the nations' output this decon
trolled crude oil sold at over $10 a barrel; all other production in
the country was regulated at $5.25, substantially below the market price.
The large integrated companies, in control of most of the supply of crude4
*

4^U. S., Congress, House, Petroleum Industry, pp. 8-10. Even
after the allocations program became mandatory, Gulf Company resisted
the regulations. U. S., Congress, Senate, Oversight Mandatory Petro
leum Allocation Programs, Part 1, Hearings before the Senate Committee
on Interior and Insular Affairs and the Senate Commerce Committee, 93d
Cong., 2d sess., 1974, pp. 37-41.
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oil, automatically had access to most of the cheaper crude.
blow the independents lost their competitive pricing edge.42

Thus, in one
Faced with

limited supplies of expensive product their steadily expanding market
share faltered and then began decreasing at a substantial rate.
In an attempt to redress the grievances of independents and at
the same time remove itself from the quagmire of price and allocation
regulations, the government proposed an interim solution that, paradoxi
cally, involved even more controls.

The Crude Entitlement Program

adopted in November, 1974^3 was designed to equalize crude oil prices
among refiners by allocating "old" crude proportionately among all refin
ers through the role of "entitlements."

Once the cost differentials

were eliminated the government hoped to remove price controls and allo
cation regulations so that the oil industry could operate in a more
unregulated economy.

The aim was admirable even if the vision was badly

distorted.
The Role of the Major Oil Companies
Certainly the government has been aware of irregular activities
in the petroleum industry.44

And when the major oil companies reported*
7

AO

The Slippery Job of Decontrolling Oil," Business Week,
7 September, 1974, pp. 60-64.
^Federal Energy Office, "Allocation of Old Oil Entitlement
Price," Washington, D.C., 5 December, 1974.
^ F o r a cursory appraisal of FTC antitrust litigation in the
petroleum industry since 1939 see II. S., Congress, House, Petroleum
Industry, pp. 3-4. For recommendations to increase competition in the
petroleum industry see U. S., Congress, Senate, Energy, pp. 46-47.
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substantial increases in profits from 1972 to 197445 the public outcry
was predictably vociferous.

Immediately defensive, the majors argued

that profits were not excessive and, in fact, were necessary in order
to recoup sluggish profits of previous years.

Actually the petroleum

industry was a "just-below-average performer" when compared with the
500 largest industrial corporations and in no way operated in a disaster
zone.46

in response to charges that the major oil companies were pos

sibly engaged in antitrust activities^ the majors have maintained that
the petroleum industry is actually far more competitive than other com
parable industries.

Their argument is based on conventional concentra

tion ratio measurements which show that the oil industry is not parti
cularly concentrated when compared with other industries.48

But these

ratios tend to understate concentration in the market;49 furthermore,
they do not measure interfirm interdependences, an entrenched and
integral component of the petroleum industry according to John Wilson:
. . . the key structural feature of the petroleum industry is
that virtually all of its corporate entities are extensively*
7
4

4^Ibid., p. viii, "A Big Bonanza In ‘Big Oil'," The National
Observer, 18 January, 1975, p. 1.
46Carol J. Loomis, "How to Think About Oil Company Profits,"
Fortune, April, 1974, p. 99; Deborah DeWitt Morley, "The Fortune Direc
tory of the 500 Largest Industrial Corporations," Fortune, May, 1974,
pp. 230-257.
47See the full report U. S., Congress, House, Petroleum Industry,
pp. 1-62.
4^John M. Blair, Economic Concentration (New York, Chicago, San
Francisco, Atlanta: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1972), p. 16.
49

Ibid., pp. 7-9.
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tied together through a very large number of joint venture
arrangements and other types of intercorporate interlocks.50
He argues persuasively that extensive direct and indirect interlocking
directorates between major oil companies effectively restrain competition,
replacing it instead with joint venture operations.

Nor is this power

ful incursion into the energy field limited to petroleum products.

The

major oil companies control most of our coal reserves and nuclear
resources and are also involved in nuclear related industries.^ Thus
the companies have a profound influence in all areas of our society;
and because they are also horizontally integrated their scope extends
beyond the energy sphere and permeates such diverse companies as IBM,
Proctor and Gamble and Caterpillar Tractor.*
53
2
1
5
The Multifaceted structure of the petroleum industry has not gone
unchallenged by the Federal Trade Commission.

On July 18, 1973, after

a detailed investigation, the FTC filed a complaint against the eight
largest petroleum companies in the United States alleging unfair com
petitive practices.53
5^John Wilson, "Market Structuie and Interfirm Integration in
the Petroleum Industry." Paper presented to the American Economic
Association, San Francisco, CA, December, 1974.
51 Ibid., pp. 7-9.
52Ibid., pp. 11-13.
53U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Agricultural
Environmental and Consumer Protection Appropriations for 1975, Hearing
before a subcommittee of the commfttee ~on~ appropriations, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess., 1974, p. 716. The eight oil companies are‘Exxon, Texaco,
Gulf, Mobil, Standard Oil [California], Standard Oil [Indiana],
Shell and Atlantic Richfield [ranked in order of assets in 1972].
FTC v. Exxon, et. al., Docket No. 8934.
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Certainly the structure and performance of the petroleum industry
provide ample grounds for such a complaint.
characterized by vertical integration

In an industry that is

joint ventureships and interlock

ing directorates, competition, except for the presence of the independent
sector, has been replaced by peaceful co-existence.

CHAPTER III

THE OIL SHORTAGE:

NORTH DAKOTA

The Market for Oil in North Dakota
In many ways, North Dakota seems far removed from the national
oil scene.

As a sparsely populated state with limited production of

crude oil, a few small refineries and a simple network of pipelines
North Dakota presents a much less complicated view of the oil industry
than its national counterpart.

For these very reasons, however, it is

much more amenable to examination.
Production of crude oil in North Dakota began in 1951, the year
that oil was discovered, increased until 1966 and then began a downward
trend decreasing at a rate of about 3.6 percent a yearJ

The number

of wells drilled in the state reached a maximum in 1958 and then declined
significantly to 1973,2 as shown in Table 3.

Of the 5,338 oil wells

drilled in North Dakota, 1,934 wells were producing as of December,
1974.3
Crude oil from North Dakota, Montana and Canada is refined at
the Amoco Oil Co. refinery at Mandan, the Westland Oil Company refinery

^North Dakota Geological Survey, production figures from ledger
accounts, University of North Dakota, Grand Forks, ND, February, 1975.
?
North Dakota Geological Survey, Official Oil in North Dakota
(Grand Forks, ND: North Dakota Geological Survey, July, 1974), pp. 255262.
3 1bid., p. 262.
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TABLE 3
CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION AND OIL WELLS DRILLED IN NORTH DAKOTA
(FROM 1951-1974)3
Years

Number of Barrels

Wells Drilled

1951-1954

12,931,060

1,004

1955-1959

69,281,049

1,503

1960-1964

121,600,022

1 ,197

1965-1969

126,532,408

1 ,087

1970-1974

104,236,358

676

aAdapted from North Dakota Geological Survey, production figures
from ledger accounts, University of North Dakota, Grand Forks, ND,
February, 1975.
and the Northland Oil and Refining Co. in Dickinson.

Amoco, which

refines about 40,000 barrels of crude oil daily, primarily supplies its
own dealers who comprise the largest group of brand dealers in the
state.^

Westland Oil Co. with a refining capacity of 15,000 barrels

of crude a day supplies its own retail outlets as well as over 100
other independent dealers.6

Northland Oil and Refining Co., which

has been closed since the 1950s, reopened in January, 1975.6

^Mrs. Olivia Miller, director of the Motor Fuel Tax Division of
the State Tax Department, private interview, Bismarck, ND, January, 1975
^Westland Oil Co. presently has more than 35 retail outlets.
Several outlets were closed in 1973 and 1974 because they were "unprofit
able." John Peterson, Westland Oil Co., Minot, ND, telephone conversa
tion, February, 1975.
Energy Messenger, No. 1, North Dakota Office of Energy Manage
ment, January, 1975.
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A network of crude and product pipelines in the northwestern
corner of the state ultimately directs petroleum products to Minot
and Bismarck.

The Portal Pipeline carries crude oil from Minot to

Grand Forks and on to the Minnesota market, while the Amoco pipeline
transports refined product from Mai

n to Fargo.

Great Lakes Pipeline, extends north a.
North Dakota has approximately 1800 mil<

A major artery, the

south along the Red River Valley.
of crude oil and petroleum

products pipeline with major pipeline prodi ts terminals located at
Minot, Grand Forks, Jamestown and Fargo.

The total storage capacity

of the state exceeds 50 million gallons which represents roughly oneeighth

of the state's yearly consumption.^

Attempts to secure informa

tion from the pipelines about the size of their inventories or the ship
ments received by their customers were unsuccessful as all information
other than that relating to general plant operation is classified.*
8
Petroleum products are marketed by several major companies and
numerous independent dealers in North Dakota.®

As of August 1, 1974

the total number of bulk and retail gasoline outlets was 1,836.

Within

^North Dakota Petroleum Council, The Williston Basin-~A New Look,
(Bismarck, ND: North Dakota Petroleum Council, 1973jk
8Cliff Wahlstrand, Manager of Williams Pipeline Co., personal
interview, Grand Forks, ND, February, 1975.
®The major companies in North Dakota, ranked by gallons of gaso
line sold in 1973 were: Amoco, Mobil, Texaco, Exxon, Phillips, and
Continental. The largest unbranded dealers in the state as of December,
1973 were Farmers Union, Westland Oil, Simonson Station Stores and
M & h Gasoline Co. State Laboratories Commission, Petroleum Products
and Anti-Freeze 1973 Report (Bismarck, ND: North Dakota State
Laboratories and Consumer Affairs, 1973), p. 22.
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this group 1,100 dealers were engaged only in retail sales, while 402
were bulk dealers only.

The remaining 334 dealers were involved in

both bulk and retail operations.^
For several years these companies have enjoyed an expanding
gasoline market.

As shown in Table 4 , ^ sales of gasoline increased

from 1970 to 1973 at approximately five percent per year.

In response

to the tight supply and higher gasoline prices that accompanied the
national energy crisis, consumption of gasoline in 1974 fell 4.7 per
cent.
TABLE 4
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN TOTAL
GASOLINE CONSUMPTION IN NORTH DAKOTA
Year

Consumption in Gallons

1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974

360,817,030
358,686,445
358,278,800
371 ,162,082
388,537,331
387,214,199
409,578,519
431,832,656
451,982,941
430,689,194
SOURCE:

Percentage Change

-.6
-.1
3.6
4.7
-.3
5.8
5.4
4.7
-4.7

Planning and Research Division, State Highway Dept.

°"Retail and Bulk Sales Outlets Numbers Compiled," Energy
Messenger, I, No. 1, North Dakota Office of Energy Management,
October, 1974.
^Planning and Research Division, State Highway Dept., "North
Dakota Gasoline Consumption 1965-1974," Bismarck, ND, 1974. (Mimeo
graphed. )
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Although the shortage of petroleum products in the United States
impacted most heavily on the eastern seaboard, the crisis rippled through
out the economy, affecting every state in the nation.

As a crude producer

and importer of accessible Canadian crude oil, North Dakota enjoyed a
relatively favorable position, but still was not immune from the crisis.
During this time significant changes took place among the major
oil companies in North Dakota.

In 1972 Exxon moved into the state by

purchasing Humble Oil and Refining and in 1973, Gulf moved out of the
state.

The reasons for the Gulf pullout are given by Jess Cooper of the

American Petroleum Institute (API) in Bismarck:
Gulf Oil left North Dakota due to economic reasons, such as
lack of total number of outlets, distribution, etc., which is
a trend among oil companies to service those areas where they
are most well known, have the supply of products and enough
outlets. The Gulf outlets in North Dakota have been purchased
by Rice Oil Company of M i n o t J 2
At the same time bulk and retail gasoline outlets experienced
a slight upward trend in closings.

According to a study conducted by

the Federal Energy Office in Bismarck, ND:
During the 1972-73 period an average of five retailers and
two bulk businesses closed each mon\,h, with only a slight
increase in closings seen in the first seven months of 1974.
The slight upward trend in closings could as well have resulted
from the normally high attrition rate as to shortages or other
factors, particularly in the service station line. Some of these
closings followed the lines of economic feasibility in the tendency
for some companies to consolidate operations in some rural areas,
eliminating unprofitable and limited-potential operations.

Letter from Jess Cooper, director of the American Petroleum
Institute, Bismarck, ND, June 4, 1974.
^"Retail and Bulk Sales," Energy Messenger. I, No. 1, Oct.,
1974.

As nationwide shortages became acute,Congress removed import
quotas and passed the Emergency Petroleum All

:ation Act in May, 1973

in an attempt to increase the supply of petroleum products and to allo
cate the supplies equitably.

When the voluntary allocations program

failed to produce the desired results, the p ogram became mandatory on
January 15, 1974.
The Allocations Program:

Nt rth Dakota

Because of its access to crude oil ana refined products North
Dakota has enjoyed a relatively good position with respect to its
supply position.

In fact, in February, 1974 North Dakota was one of

ten states designated by William Simon, Administrator of the Federal
Energy Office at that time, to shift two percent of its gasoline
supplies to states with a critical need for gasoline.
Originally, the Emergency Petrolaum Allocation Act of 1973 was
administered by the Disaster Emergency Services in Bismarck to allocate
only middle d i s t i l l a t e s . I n January, 1974 the Office of Energy Manage
ment was officially created to carry out the allocations program.15*
I

^Sorae middle distillates are heating oil and diesel fuel while
the residual oils are generally heavier fuel oils, tar and asphalt.
See State Laboratories Department, "Petroleum Products and Anti-Freeze,
1973 Report," No. 172 (Bismarck, ND: State Laboratories Commission),
pp. 5-16.
I c

See Appendix A for a jrief description of the allocations
program. U. S., Congress, Se ate, Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, Oversight Mandatory Petroleum Allocations Programs 1
Part 1, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs and the Senate Commerce Committee, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 3548.
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Operating in accordance with the Federal regulations this office
extended its services to include allocations of gasoline and propane
as well.
Under this program, the Office of Energy Management in Bismarck
receives monthly three percent of the gasoline and four percent of all
other petroleum products of all companies furnishing product in the
state.

These companies include Amoco, Apco, Ashland-Northwest Refining,

Atlantic Richfield, Champlin, Chevron, Clark Oil, Conoco, Exxon, Farmers
Union, Farmland, Gulf, Husky, Kerr-McGee, Koch, Midland, Mobil, Murphy,
Oskey, Pasco, Phillip, Signal [Solar], Skelly, Sun, Tesor, Texaco,
Thunderbird [Westland], Triangle, Union 76, and as of January, 1975,
Northland Oil and Refining Company.^
Although the allocations program includes all petroleum products
received in the state, only the information on gasoline is examined.
Table 5 sets forth the monthly state set-aside and withdrawal of gaso
line by the Office of Energy Management from February, 1973 to December,
1974 in the state of North Dakota.

It further identifies recipients

of products as end users or resellers.^
The amount of gasoline withdrawn from the set-aside varied by
month from a low of 14 percent to a high of almost 43 percent.

At

the end of every month the state cleared its inventories by assigning
to each supplier the amount of unused set-aside remaining in his
account.

This unused set-aside then became a part of the supplier's

^ Energy Messenger, Vol.II, No. 1, January, 1975.
17

Office of Energy Management, "State Set-Aside and Withdrawals
of Gasoline," Bismarck, ND, February, 1974 to December, 1974.
(Mimeographed.)
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inventory for the following month.

In this manner the state assured

itself of receiving three percent of the total available monthly supply
of gasoline without accumulating inventories.
TABLE 5
STATE SET-ASIDE WITHDRAWALS OF
GASOLINE FROM FEBRUARY 1974 TO DECEMBER 1974*
Month

Set-Aside

End User

Reseller

Total
Used

Percent
Used

February

734,900

3,300

115,300

118,600

16.14%

March

891,737

21,000

361,452

382,452

42.89

April

917,163

27,400

365,758

393,158

42.87

May

1,085,523

28,300

298,497

326,797

30.11

June

1,198,373

16,620

181,664

198,284

16.54

July

1,356,782

21,450

323,498

344,948

25.42

August

1,659,000

20,500

224,936

245,436

14.79

September

1,270,962

0

417,303

417,303

32.83

October

1,203,991

22,500

407,052

429,552

35.6

November

1,132,614

0

367,894

367,894

32.48

December

1,075,116

8,000

359,822

367,822

34.68

*S0URCE:

Office of Energy Management, Bismarck, ND

58501

Although the set- aside program was designed to meet the needs
of the end user such as a hospital or school, the end user has used
a much smaller proportion of the set-aside than the reseller.

For

example, May, 1974, was the month that end users received their
largest allocation during 1974.

This represented 2.7 percent of the

total state set-aside for that month.

In contrast, resellers received
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27.4 percent of the state set-aside for the month; for all other months
resellers received an even larger proportion of the set-aside.

Although

the total number of end user requests was very high in the early stages
of the program there has been a marked decline since June, 1974 in the
number of requests.

On the other hand, requests by resellers for gaso

line has remained high for every month except September, 1974.
In other words, although the program was designed to help the
end user over a critical shortage, the majority of the requests were
from resellers; and not surprisingly most of the gasoline allocated
from the state set-aside also went to these resellers.
Monthly maps drawn up to pinpoint allocations yielded no conclu
sive information.18

Although allocations were concentrated in the

eastern part of the state, this was likely due to population concentra
tions rather than other factors.
The allocations program has been simple and direct in meeting
requests for petroleum products.^

If an end user required gasoline

he could apply to the state for an allocation.

In turn the state would

supply him with gasoline out of the set-aside of his original supplier.
If, however, the set-aside had been used up, the state would furnish
gasoline from the set-aside of another supplier.

This crossing of

supply lines was a temporary measure and in no way placed an obliga
tion on the new supplier to continue to furnish product to the end user.

^Federal Energy Office, "State Set-Aside Recipients in 1974,"
Bismarck, NO, 1974. (Mimeographed maps.)
^This does not mean the allocations program has been free of
problems. See U. S., Congress, Senate, Petroleum Allocations, pp. 4862.
----------------------
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Although the end user was always assured of a supply of petroleum
products whether his original supplier had an inventory from which to
draw, the reseller faced definite limitations on his requests for allo
cation.

Where confronted with a shortage of gasoline, he could apply

to the state for an allocation, but his allocation had to come from the
set-aside of his original supplier.

If his supplier was extremely short

of product, the reseller and the Office of Energy Management would receive
correspondingly low allotments of product that month.

However, the

shortage would increase the demand for state set-aside at a time when
this set-aside was automatically low.
Undoubtedly, numerous requests for gasoline would use up the
allocation before the month end, and further requests would go unful
filled even though the state had set-aside of other suppliers from which
to draw.

In such an instance the allocations program has done nothing

to relieve the problem of shortage; it has simply attempted to allocate
the shortage fairly.
Still, it is likely that small or marginal stations could not
have Survived without the gasoline allocations program.20

in the face

of shortages, gasoline could readily have been directed away from less
profitable outlets towards those that were more profitable, thereby
hastening the demise of the small operator.

It is also likely that

small dealers, unable to obtain gasoline either on their own or through
the strict operation of the allocation program, have also been helped

^Approximately one hundred and three branded and unbrarided
dealers were contacted. Of this number twenty dealers indicated that
the allocations program was vital to their survival.
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by the concerned intervention of people in the Energy Office,21 who per
suaded suppliers with ample set-aside to furnish gasoline to various
hard pressed dealers.

It should be noted that the state can allocate

gasoline in this instance only with the permission of the supplier.
However, there appear to be decided disadvantages and inequities
in the program.
chasers of

r

Under the regulations, allocations to wholesale pur

soline were based on their 1972 sales.

Each dealer, havin

been assigned his allocation, would then receive a supply of product
dependent on the allocation fraction for each supplier of gasoline.
The problems involved in determining a fair allocation were many
For example, an operator who began closing out his business in retail
gasoline in 1973 in favor of a car wash and who needed only a limited
supply of product, was able, on the basis of his 1972 allocation, to
obtain a much greater supply than the demand at that time warranted.22
On the other hand, dealers attempting to expand business were locked
in by the allocations program.

One retailer bid on and secured a con

tract to supply gasoline to schools in his district for 1974.

However,

his allocation in 1974 was based on his sales in 1972, which did not

Phil Miller, Federal Energy Office, private interview,
Bismarck, ND, January, 1975.
22

A list of independent bulk dealers, who had gone out of
business since 1972, was supplied by the Motor Fuel Tax Division.
Another government agency also provided similar information. All
dealers on the lists were contacted. All were candid about their
business failures and many times named other independent dealers who
were struggling to survive. The references to many of these dealers
is drawn from more than fifty personal interviews and phone calls.
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include the school contract.

Because he was unable to fulfill his

contractual obligations his competitor supplied the school district
with higher priced gasoline.
Another dealer who had been in the retail gasoline business
for 15 years encountered even more frustrating problems.

After seven

years as an employee of a firm and eight years as a brand name dealer,
he decided in the fall of 1973 to become an independent, but when he
received his allocation in January, 1974, it was based only on his
sales for the two months that he had operated his business as an
unbranded dealer.

After struggling for three months with an inadequate

supply of product and incurring losses of $600, of which a significant
portion was spent on telephone calls to various district, regional and
federal offices, he decided to close his business.
The operation of the state set-aside program is also open to
question.

Since inventories did not accumulate to certain minimum

levels, shortages were exaggerated.

All unused set-aside was reas

signed to the original supplier at the end of every month and the
suppliers began each new month with a completely new inventory based
on three percent of that month's supply.

This meant that in the event

of a shortage on any particular month, the set-aside would be smaller
and the demand tor allocation greater; hence, requests could not be
adequately met.

If surpluses from previous months had been allowed to

accumulate the problem of shortages might have been less acute.
In an assessment of the federal allocations program, it must
be noted that the program was designed to distribute shortages of
petroleum products in the United States as equitably as possible.
On the basis of data collected, it appears that the program in North
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Dakota, at least with respect to taxable gasoline, has been success
ful.

This conclusion is based on the fact that there has been no

appreciable change in the position of branded and unbranded dealers
with respect to their market share of gasoline from 1973 to 1974, as
shown in Table 6.
TABLE 6
PERCENT OF TAXABLE GASOLINE RECEIVED BY BRANDED
AND UNBRANDED COMPANIES IN NORTH DAKOTA IN 1973 AND 1974a
1973

1974

Branded

57.0%

57.2%

Unbranded

43.0%

42.8%

aCompiled from: Motor Fuel Tax Division, State Tax Department,
"Total Taxable Gallons of Gasoline Sold in North Dakota from 1973
to 1974," Bismarck, ND, 1974. (Ledgers.)

CHAPTER IV

THE INDEPENDENT DEALERS:

NORTH DAKOTA

Market Share
To assess the position of the independent bulk dealers in the
state, figures were compiled from the State Laboratories, the Highway
Department and the Motor Fuel Tax Division of the State Tax Department,
and are presented in several tables as a Market Share Study.

]

A central

problem in this undertaking has been to identify companies as branded
or unbranded, i.e., major or independent.
For purposes of this study, the unbranded oil companies include
independent refiners and non-branded independent marketers.

As defined

by the Federal Energy Administration:
. . . an "Independent refiner" means a refiner which (a) obtained,
directly or indirectly, in the calendar quarter which ended
immediately prior to November 27, 1973, more than 70 percent of
its refinery input of domestic crude oil or 70 percent of its
refinery input of domestic and imported crude oil from producers
which do not control, are not controlled by, and are not under
common control with such refiner, and (b) marketed or distributed
in such quarter and continues to market or distribute a substantial

^Figures from the Planning and Research Division of the State
Highway Department are an accurate record of the total number of gallons
of gasoline consumed yearly in the state of North Dakota. Total consump
tion includes gallons allowed for shrinkage and other losses, gallons
sold out of state, gallons sold tax exempt to the Federal Government,
gallons assigned to farmers and to aviation and gallons sold subject to
a seven cent tax. The gasoline which is subject to tax is retail gaso
line. The State Laboratories compile data on total gallons of gasoline
consumed yearly as well.
However, their figures tend to be less accur
ate and consistently lower than those of the State Highway Department.
Figures from the Motor Fuel Tax Division of the State Tax Department
are an accurate record of taxable gasoline consumed in the state.
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volume of gasoline refined by it through branded independent
marketers or non-branded independent marketers. A "non-branded
marketer" means a firm which is engaged in the marketing or dis
tribution of refined petroleum products, but which (a) is not a
refiner, (b) is not a firm which controls, is controlled by, is
under common control with, or ts affiliated with a refiner [other
than by means of a supply contract], and (r) is not a branded
independent marketer.2
The identification of branded and unbranded, independent dealers
is critical to a market share study.5 Once this is determined it is
possible to calculate the market share of each of the specified groups
from data compiled by the State Laboratories Department of North
Dakota.^

These figures, which include all petroleum products received

by companies in the state, are based on reports of all in-shipments of
oil that the companies must submit to the State Laboratories.

This

accounting procedure is designed to facilitate the various tests required
by law, to ensure that only high quality petroleum products enter the
state.5

Although the State Laboratories Department Bulletins contain

comprehensive data on gasoline, heating oil, diesel fuel, kerosene and
tractor fuel, only the data on gasoline is used in this study.2
5
*
3

2

U. S. President Proclamation, "Mandatory Petroleum Allocation,"
Federal Register, XXXIX, No. 88, May 6, 1974, 15972.
3

See Chapter III for a list of branded and large unbranded
dealers in the state. This identification was based on the definition
of the Federal Energy administration cited earlier, and supported by
data from U.S., Congress, Senate, Fair Marketing, pp. 237-238; U.S.,
Congress, Senate, Petroleum, pp. 45-62.
^State Laboratories Commission, Petroleum Products, p. 22.
See the reports for 1965 to 1973 for a full assessment.
5Ibid., pp. 3-38.
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The oil companies are classified as branded or unbranded and
their percentage share of the gasoline market in North Dakota is com
piled for the years 1965-1973 as shown in Table 7.
TABLE 7
PERCENT OF GASOLINE RECEIVED BY BRANDED
AND UNBRANDED COMPANIES IN NORTH DAKOTA
(FROM 1965-1973)
1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

Branded

42.1

41.2

41.8

42.9

44.7

45.7

45.3

45.6

47.3

Unbranded

57.9

58.8

58.2

57.1

55.3

54.3

54.7

54.4

52.7

Adapted from: State Laboratories Commission, Petroleum
Products and Anti Freeze Reports 1965-1973, (Bismarck, HD: North
Dakota State~Laboratories and Consumer Affairs, 1973).
By identifying the larger companies, that is those selling .3
percent or more of the gasoline in the state, it is possible to break
down the marketing patterns even further, as shown in Table 8.
It is significant that the figures from the State Laboratories
were compiled, collected and analyzed in a consistent manner over a
period of years.

Therefore, inferences drawn from the market share

study reflect fairly accurately the changes that were occurring in
the market place between 1965 and 1975.
Foremost among the observations is the position of the branded
dealers who have gradually increased their share of total gasoline
sales in the state from 42.1 percent in 1965 to 47.3 percent in 1973.
This increase in the market share occurred primarily at the expense
of the small independent oil company operator in the state who has
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seen his share of the market decline from 22.5 percent in 1965 to 16.9
percent in 1973, while the larger unbranded oil companies have retained
a fairly steady 35 percent of the market.b

TABLE 8
PERCENT OF GASOLINE RECEIVED BY BRANDED AND
LARGE AND SMALL UNBRANDED COMPANIES IN NORTH DAKOTA3
1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

Branded

42.1

41.2

41.8

42.9

44.7

45.7

45.3

45.6

47.3

Largeb
Unbranded

35.4

36.4

35.2

35.5

36.7

37.3

37.0

37.7

35.8

Smallc
Unbranded

22.5

22.4

23.0

21.6

18.6

17.0

17.7

16.7

16.9

aAdapted from: State Laboratories Commission, Petroleum
Products and Anti Freeze Reports 1965-1973, (Bismarck, ND: North
Dakota State Laboratories and Consumer Affairs, 1973).
^Dealers selling .3 percent or more of the gasoline in the
state.
cDealers selling less than .3 percent of the gasoline in the
state.
It is interesting to note that the large unbranded companies
gradually expanded their market share from 35.5 percent in 1968 to
37.7 percent in 1972.

In 1973, the year of critical shortages and

a voluntary allocations program, the large unbranded companies lost
r

Data from the Motor Fuel Tax Division indicate somewhat dif
ferent results. These data show that the small unbranded dealers
account for only one percent of the market share of taxable gasoline.
This may be because of sales to farmers which are n d taxable, although
this would assume that a very large share of the farmers' market
is filled by small independents.
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almost all of that increase, and saw their market share fall to 35.8
percent.
Survey Results
In 1969, 401 bulk dealers were listed by the North Dakota State
Tax Department.'7

By 1973 the number had grown to 423, probably in

response to the expanding gasoline market.

However, by the end of

1974 at least seventeen of these dealers were out of business, a few
because of retirement but most of them in direct response to the energy
crunch.

Numerous telephone calls and personal interviews substantiate

this statement since all conversations elicited similar responses;8
the small unbranded dealer faced with acute shortages and higher
priced gasoline could not compete with brand name rivals.

For many,

the struggle to secure gasoline from new sources or from the state
set-aside was so burdensome that they retired prematurely.

Other

younger dealers, determined to survive, continued operations only to
succumb later to price inequities.
Almost all of these unbranded bulk dealers stated that they
were required to pay six cents a gallon more for gasoline than their
brand name rivals.

To emphasize their hopeless competitive position,

many pointed out that they could buy gasoline at retail prices more

^Motor Fuel Tax Division, State Tax Department, "Licensed
Motor Vehicle Fuel Dealers, State of North Dakota, 1969-1973,"
Bismarck, ND, 1973. (Mimeographed.)
O

All unbranded dealers who were no longer in business were
listed by the Motor Fuel Tax Division. Three dealers could not be
located but all others were contacted. All spoke freely of their
difficulties and reasons for closing, and frequently referred to
other dealers who were presently struggling with the same set of
problems.
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cheaply from major brand dealers than they could off the pipeline
from their own suppliers.
At least three dealers indicated that they had an ample
supply of product and a fixed market but preferred to close their
businesses so that their customers could buy gasoline more cheaply
elsewhere.

As suppliers of farmers they received 100 percent of

their allocation; but they were forced to charge their farm customers
six cents a gallon more than local major brand dealers who were also
supplying farmers in the area.

Rather than operate under such unpal

atable conditions, they transferred their allocations to a major brand
dealer so that their former farm customers could buy gasoline at the
lower price.
A number of other small unbranded dealers indicated that they
were staying in business with great difficulty buoyed mainly by the
expectation that the situation would improve.
Interestingly enough, the smaller dealer was much more will
ing to talk about the precariousness of his business and to mention
others who were also struggling than were the larger unbranded dealers.
In this way two or three larger independents in North Dakota were
identified as having severe problems.

One unbranded dealer asserted

that the majors were driving a large independent out of business.
Furthermore, he emphasized that his information was based on a long
and friendly relationship with this dealer, who had just the previous
day confided his many problems.

However, a phone call to the dealer

elicited no information along these lines.

On the contrary, it was

stated that business was "quite good" and that there were "no prob
lems.
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Phone calls to other larger independents brought forth varying
responses; some were cautious about criticizing major oil companies,
a few vigorously lampooned the role of the government, and all were
reticent about revealing financial difficulties.

A broad, general

consensus was probably that "conditions are presently not good" and
that the government should stop making so many rules and regulations.
The two major irksome regulations denounced by these dealers
were the allocations program and the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA).

The allocations program was attacked because

it prevented the large independent from expanding his market share
through good competitive practices.

Restricted to a fixed allocation,

his natural incentive to expand was effectively squelched.
One large independent bulk dealer in the state imported over
two million gallons of gasoline from Canada from January, 1974 to
April, 1974.

These imports comprised about two-thirds of his supply

of gasoline.

When the imposition of a Canadian tax on imported oil

dictated that it was no longer economically feasible to continue
importing oil, a variety of companies supplied product:

Rice and

Lindquist, Oskey, Midwest, Farstad, Northwestern Refining Co., Pet
roleum Trading and Transport, Conoco and ultimately, the Office of
Energy Management in Bismarck, ND.
On the basis of a compilation of raw data this company was
able to expand its share of the market of taxable gasoline sales from
.6 percent to .9 percent--an impressive 50 percent increase in sales
from October, 1973 to October, 1974.

When higher priced Canadian

oil effectively curtailed imports and this dealer was confined by
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the federal allocations program, his market share fell to its former
level.^
The regulations set forth by OSilA were criticized by all inde
pendents, but particularly by the smaller dealer.

Although all dealers

recognized the value of safety regulations, they indicated that some
of the demands were unreasonable and many were so costly that they
could not afford to institute them.

In fact, several stated categori

cally that only the major companies could bear the additional financial
burden of these regulations which could ultimately drive many of the
independents out of business.
In fairness to many dedicated, industrious government employees
and the regulations they enforce, it must be pointed out that most of
the unbranded dealers believed some government control of major oil
companies was important, even vital, to their survival.

Many of the

small independents acknowledged that they could not have survived
without the allocations program although they would have preferred
a rescue operation free of government intervention.

A number of the

large unbranded companies were also favorably disposed towards the
allocation program, asserting that it was "working quite well."

Per

haps the outbursts were, in part, prompted by difficult economic con
ditions that have been aggravated by the increasing amount of paper
work generated by government regulations on allocation, price fixing
and safety standards.

g

This information is based on a compilation of data from bills
of lading and accounts receivable of the Motor Fuel Tax Division of
the State Tax Department, Bismarck, ND.
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In large measure the responses tended to vary with the sources
of supply of gasoline.

An unbranded dealer primarily dependent on

independent refiners seemed favorably disposed towards the program,
whereas those dealers who had some connection with the majors showed
less enthusiasm for the government regulations on allocation.
In an attempt to further assess the situation, a questionnaire
was prepared and then distributed by the Retail Gasoline Dealers
Association in Bismarck.^

Of the 361 members in this organization,

54 returned the questionnaire, and of this group, 51 of the respondents
were branded dealers.
On the basis of their replies, it appears that the major brand
dealers in North Dakota have generally prospered during the critical
period from 1972-1974.

Amoco, the largest supplier in the state with

26 percent of the market, had no difficulty supplying its outlets; and,
in fact, only one or two of the major suppliers have experienced
shortages.

About 40 percent of those responding to the questionnaire

believed that there actually was a shortage of gasoline prior to the
allocations program and most agreed that presently [as of October, 1974]
there is no shortage.

Most dealers seemed to have had very little

difficulty obtaining a supply of gasoline during the critical months
prior to allocation.

Moreover, when the allocations program was enacted,

only 27 percent applied for allocations and indicated that this alloca
tion was critical to the survival of their business.
Conversations with various brand name dealers tend to confirm
these findings.

Several dealers indicated that product was available

throughout the "shortage" period, that dealers with surplus product
^ S e e Appendix B for a copy of the questionnaire and a summary
of the results.
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willingly sold to rival brand dealers with inadequate supply and that
the insufficiencies of these sources were supplemented by the black
market.'^
Generally, then, these major brand dealers were not as affected
by shortages as the unbranded dealers.

This observation is borne out

by a three percentage point increase in the market share of brand
dealers during 1973, as noted above.
In addition to experiencing limited problems of supply, the
brand name dealers apparently enjoyed an increased mark-up on gasoline
and therefore a greater return on their investment.

A number of dealers

indicated that their profit margin had increased so substantially that
they were working fewer hours while enjoying their most lucrative returns
ever.

This situation they attributed directly to the increased mark-up

on gasoline and the absence of costly gas wars.
Although the majority of these dealers leased their stations
they seemed satisfied with the arrangements.

Some expressed disagree

ment with a yearly contractual agreement and others voiced concern
that the "30 day notice" clause was a powerful option of disenfran
chisement available to major companies.

Under this arrangement either

party could submit in writing a notice of termination of all contrac
tual obligations within 30 days and, in fact, some smaller stations
had received notification.

Conversations with two brand name dealers

revealed that an inability to sell quotas set by the supplier provided

^Several references were made to a black market, but no further
information could be obtained.
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legal grounds for a termination of contract.

Both dealers were in

rural communities selling relatively small amounts of product; one
dealer was able to secure product from a rival brand dealer in the
town, while the other was forced to close and seek other employment.
A large number of closings of brand name stations in smaller
communities tend to reinforce the observation that smaller, marginal
stations experienced a more rapid decline during these critical months.
Only a few dealers expressed concern that the increasing profit
ability of their operations might entice the major companies to fur
ther encroach on their independence, yet they overwhelmingly supported
legislation co-sponsored by Congressman Mark Andrews which would protect
independent service operators from having their stations taken away
from them by major oil companies without just cause.

Congressman

Andrews noted that major oil companies had cancelled a number of leases
and placed stations under company management.

Because of this he

believed that legislation to counter this encroachment on the part of
major oil companies was essential to the survival of the small business
man.
This Bill [HR 15951] passed the Senate but did not get out of
the Committee in the House.

It died December 31, 1974, but has been

re-introduced, although it does not have Senator Andrews' name on it.
It appears then that the small dealers in the state, whether
branded or unbranded, have encountered numerous difficulties.

Indi

cations are that the small unbranded dealers who have steadily lost
their market share of gasoline since 1965 have experienced an increas
ing rate of failure since the energy crisis.
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Although the large unbranded dealers have maintained their
market share of gasoline, they have been caught in a cost-price squeeze
because of their limited access to cheaper domestic crude oil; only
the large brand dealers seem to have prospered since the energy crisis.

CHAPTER V

Summary and Conclusions
Although the purpose of this study has been to examine the
petroleum industry, and particularly the independent marketer of gaso
line in North Dakota, the presence of major integrated oil companies
in the state necessitates an examination of the industry on a national
as well as a state level.

The structure of the industry is such that

changes at the state level are simply a reflection of changing policy
that is orchestrated at a national level.
The major integrated oil companies in the United States effec
tively control the production, transportation, refining and marketing
of petroleum products.

Because of this concentration of power and the

vertically integrated structure of the petroleum industry these companies
have been able to regulate the size and distribution of profits.
Until recently crude production was the most profitable operation
within the petroleum industry.

According to the report of the Federal

Trade Commission (F.T.C.)
. . . it is important to note that no technological imperative
renders crude production inherently profitable and refinery
and marketing operations inherently unprofitable. Rather, the
tax laws have made it highly remunerative for integrated firms
to artificially shift profits away from downstream activities
toward the crude end of integrated business. This goal is
accomplished by raising crude prices through various controls
of supply. I

S . , Congress, Senate, Petroleum, p. 17.
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Import quotas, state prorationing and oil depletion allowances
have successfully limited the supply of crude oil "to a point which
reduces their refinery profits to zero."^
A variety of exclusionary tactics further consolidates the
market power of the majors.

These include exchange agreements, pro

cess agreements and discrimination in the use of pipelines.

In other

words "the industry operates much like a cartel with 15 to 20 integrated
firms being the beneficiaries of much federal and state policy."3
Despite the market power of the majors the independent sector
of the petroleum industry has remained a viable, competitive force,
particularly in the area of retail gasoline.

During the 1960s the

aggressive, innovative technique? of the independent retailers resulted
in a significant increase of their market share of gasoline.

In part,

this expansion was attributable to the availability of surplus gaso
line sold at a discount by the majors.

With the onset of shortages

in 1972 many independents were forced out of business.

As a partial

solution to the plight of the independent sector of the petroleum
industry, the federal allocations program became mandatory in January,
1974.

21bid., p. 17.
3lbid., p. 27. See Michael G. Harvey, Roger A. Kerin and
John A. Herber, "The Price of Mideast Crude Oil: A Shift in the
Balance of Power," Atlantic Economic Review, March-April, 1975, p. 10.
The oligopsonistic nature of the buyers' market which prevents real
price competition and results in effective price controls by the
dominant majors is illustrated graphically.
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The allocations program, which was designed to distribute
shortages in the country as equitably as possible, appears to have
been successful in North Dakota.

This conclusion is based on the

fact that there has been no appreciable change in the position of
branded and unbranded dealers with respect to their market share of
taxable gasoline from 1973 to 1974.

Both years the branded dealers

sold 57 percent of the taxable gasoline in the state while unbranded
dealers accounted for 43 percent of the market share.
Although the allocations program has affected the independent
marketers primarily through the equitable distribution of crude oil
to refineries, they have also benefited from the state set-aside
program.

Many independents— large and smal1— applied for and received

additional gasoline from the state.

In fact, a number of dealers

attributed their existence to this program and the concerned action
of members in the Federal Energy Office.
Although the larger unbranded dealers appeared quite cognizant
of the reasons underlying the allocations program, many of the smaller
dealers have been frustrated with the system.

The problem of struggling

with inadequate supplies of gasoline when the majors seemed amply sup
plied and the state had unused inventories of gasoline created a great
deal of resentment and criticism of the program.
If the state set-aside had been devised as a common pool from
which all dealers could draw, rather than a restrictive system allow
ing dealers to obtain additional product only from their own suppliers,
then shortages would likely have been less acute for many individual
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dealers.

The present system, whereby inventories are cleared each

month, does not alleviate shortage; it simply allocates the shortage
equitably.
The six cent price differential on each gallon of gasoline
created more concern than the allocations program, since this was
often the factor that finally forced the smaller dealer out of busi
ness.

The Crude Entitlements Program enacted in November, 1974 should

alleviate this discrepancy in prices.
There is no doubt that the small unbranded dealers in North
Dakota who have seen their market share of gasoline decline from 22.5
percent in 1955 to 16.9 percent in 1973 have been gradually replaced
by branded dealers.

The personal service that has ranked high in con

sumer preference in North Dakota and has long been an integral feature
of small dealerships has been gradually replaced by larger establish
ments offering a variety of services and repairs beyond the financial
capabilities of the small dealer.
With the onset of the energy crisis these small dealers received
the brunt of the impact.

Some operated marginal stations that would

lilely have closed eventually; the shortage simply accelerated the
process.

Others operated established businesses that closed in direct

response to the energy crunch.
It is more difficult to assess the position of the large
unbranded dealers in North Dakota.

A great reluctance to discuss

problems and, in some cases, outright denial of difficulties have
compounded the problem, but it is clear that these dealer’s have also
experienced difficulties.

By seeking out new sources of supply they

have managed to secure adequate supplies of gasoline; it is the price
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of gasoline that appears to have been the more serious problem.

Many

of these dealers have paid three to six cents more per gallon of gaso
line than the majors and have been caught in a cost-price squeeze that
has placed them in a precarious position.
Although the independents have experienced a considerable
degree of difficulty since the energy crisis, it appears that the
large established brand name dealers in North Dakota have prospered.
Relieved of gas wars, assured of adequate supplies of gasoline and
enjoying an improved profit margin on each gallon of gasoline sold,
they have enjoyed a pleasant period of stability and profitability.
On the other hand, small branded dealers have not always fared
as well.

The major oil companies have argued that many of their

smaller stations have closed or consolidated along the lines of "eco
nomic feasibility."

Their aggressive consolidation has drawn flak and

led to a proposal for federal legislation that would thwart the arbi
trary cancellation of leases.

The active participation of Congressman

Mark Andrews of North Dakota indicates that this has been a concern
of branded dealers in the state; and the concern is justified.
The major oil companies appear to be charting a new course in
an attempt to maximize profits.

With the emergence of OPEC as an

effective power, the large companies have had limited success in their
attempt to control the supply and price of crude oil; and, with the
repeal of the oil depletion allowance for major oil companies in the
early months of 1975, the large integrated companies lost a consider
able tax advantage in the production of crude oil.

The result is that

they have begun to look to the refining and marketing sectors of the
petroleum industry in an attempt to improve their profit position.
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Even if the shortages of petroleum products in 1972 and 1973
were not contrived, there is no doubt that the majors benefited sub
stantially from the rapid demise of the independent retailers during
that time; and if they continue to focus upon refining and marketing
to improve their profit picture, then the independent retailers will
continue to fight an unequal battle with the giants of the industry.
The decline of the independent sector of the petroleum industry
will effectively weaken competition within the industry, and ultimately
eliminate it.

To maintain the independents as a viable, competitive

force, therefore, it is necessary to attack the source of monopolistic
power within the petroleum industry.
Crude oil has been the key to market power— the critical factor
that determines output, prices and profits; thus, a physical divorce
ment of crude oil production from other industry activities would
probably weaken this power and thus improve the position of the inde
pendents.

To disperse the concentration of power this separation

would require new independent companies in crude oil activities; and
to prevent a manipulation of prices and profits, all segments of the
industry— production, transportation, refining and marketing— would
be required to separate operating and accounting procedures and thus
prevent the shifting of profits that has characterized industry per
formance to date.
The petroleum industry is a multifaceted structure with immense,
pervasive power that permeates so much of our economic life that it
should be opened up for further examination.

Access to statistics

other than those supplied by major oil companies and a further
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investigation into the operation of these companies at every level of
industry would be desirable.

APPENDIX A

THE ALLOCATIONS PROGRAM

The allocations program was implemented in January 15, 1974 to
administer the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973.
The Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973 requires the
equitable distribution of available refined petroleum products, includ
ing gasoline, among all regions of the Nation, sectors of the petroleum
industry, and among all end users.

Section 4(c) (1) of the Act requires

that the mandatory allocation program shall be so structured as to
result in the allocation of gasoline to each independent marketer (and
to each small and independent refiner who purchases gasoline) in an
amount not less than the amount sold or otherwise supplied to such
marketer (or refiner) during the corresponding period of 1972, adjusted
to provide for pro rata reductions to reflect the aggregate shortage
in the current period as compared with the corresponding period of
1972.
The regulations issued by the Federal Energy Office provide for
allocations to certain classes of end users and to all wholesale pur
chasers of gasoline (typically retail service stations) on the basis
of their 1972 base period volumes.

Allocations to certain classes of

end users are specified at 100 percent current requirements.

These

include agriculture, emergency public services, and several other
priority categories.
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Under the regulations each supplier of gasoline (typically a
refiner) must distribute available supplies on a pro rata (proportion
ate) basis to each retail service station which it served during 1972.
Stations without a historical supplier may be assigned a supplier and
a base period volume under the "new customer" provisions of the regu
lations.

If a supplier does not have a sufficient supply to meet the

base period volumes for all its retail service stations, the regulations
require him to reduce his deliveries to all stations proportionately.
This is accomplished by applying an allocation fraction.
An allocation fraction for each supplier is set by dividing
total available supplies of gasoline by total requirements.

Require

ments for each supplier are the sum of its wholesale purchaser's base
period volumes.

The allocation fraction is applied to each wholesale

purchaser's base period volume to calculate the amount of fuel each
receives.

Within narrow limits specified in the regulations (five per

cent), the allocation fraction for each supplier of gasoline must be
uniform throughout the United States.

For example, an Exxon service

station in Maryland must receive virtually the same percentage of his
1972 base period volume as an Exxon station in Idaho.
Although the regulatory scheme results in uniformly equitable
allocations among retail service stations of a single supplier, dif
ferent suppliers will have different allocation fractions— reflecting
the fact chat each supplier has different levels of total supplies
compared to the requirements of his purchasers.

Accordingly, an Exxon

service station in Maryland may receive a different percentage of his
1972 volume than a Shell service station across the street.
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Despite the equitable allocation of gasoline among all retail
gasoline stations throughout the Nation, supply imbalances may occur
among states for the following reasons:
1.

Because of the differences in allocation fractions among
suppliers, the average allocation fraction in effect in
each state will naturally vary.

Each state will have a

different mix of suppliers serving the service stations
in that state.
2.

The agricultural priority under the Act has been implemented
in the regulations by allowing agricultural users to certify
100 percent of current requirements--rather than base period
volumes.

This means that states with significant agricul

tural requirements may receive relatively greater supplies
of gasoline than other states.
3.

There have been different rates of growth in gasoline
sales since the base period in different states.

This

difference reflects both normal growth of an area and
unusual growth associated with areas where the closing of
some stations during 1973 resulted in the remaining stations
having more customers than they did in 1972.
4.

The manner in which demand for gasoline has changed in a
state since the bc^a period, and in response to the energy
crisis itself, will differ from state to state.

For

example, conservation measures such as reducing sp ad limits
and encouraging reductions in pleasure driving may reduce
demand for gasoline less in urban areas where daily commut
ing is a major factor in gasoline consumption than in
other parts of the country.
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5.

The existing shortages tend to be felt more severely among
gas stations located near population centers because it
appears people are tending to fill their tank close to
where they live or work as possible.

Fewer fill-ups are

occurring in outlying areas where, in normal times, pleasure
driving was taking people farther away from their homes
and jobs.
The regulations issued by the Federal Energy Office are designed
to minimize these differences among states:
1.

Equitable allocation among all dealers and enforcement of
the historical supplier-purchaser relationships means that
major suppliers may not withdraw from a region of the
country which they served in 1972 (without the permission
of the Federal Energy Office) and such suppliers may not
discriminate in allocations among their stations in dif
ferent regions.

2.

The regulations provide for adjustments to increase base
period volumes of retail service stations to reflect growth
in sales since the base period.

These adjustments should

correct supply imbalances among states that may presently
exist due to a non-uniform pattern of growth or a large
number of station closings since the base period.

Adjust

ments for increased growth require the processing of a
form for each station requesting an adjustment by either
the supplier or the Federal Energy Office.
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Provisions for emergencies and extra state supply imbalances
is made under the regulations through the state set-aside program.
At present two percent of the total supply of product available in
a state must be set-aside from inventories of the suppliers of that
state to be allocated by the state office in the event of emergency
or hardship cases.
Despite attempts to decentralize the administration of the
program, regional and state offices, the Federal Energy Office retains
authority to redirect supplies from one area to another in the event
of severe supply imbalances.

APPENDIX B

The following questionnaire is part of the information being
gathered for a Master's thesis in Economics at the University of
North Dakota. It is an attempt to assess the impact of the energy
crisis on gas dealers in North Dakota and to determine the role of
the major oil companies during this crisis.
Your full cooperation in responding to the questionnaire
would be extremely helpful.
Please feel free to comment on any of the questions, or on
the questionnaire in general.
Denise Markovich
QUESTIONNAIRE
Yes

No

N/A

94%

6%

1.

Do you operate a brand name service station?

96%

4%

2.

Are you self-employed?

74%

26%

3.

Do you lease your station?

44%

43%

4.

Is your lease renewed yearly?
explain the arrangement.

65%

35%

5.

Are you satisfied with this arrangement?
If not, please explain.

6.
11%

89%

Has your lessor exerted pressure on you to
open 24 hours a day?

41%

59%

increase gasoline sales?

13%

87%

install a car wash?

9%

91%

"behave" and not dispute major oil company
policy?

14%

7.

If not, please

Congressman Andrews announced July 12 that
he had co-sponsored a bill to protect indepen
dent service station operators from having
their stations taken away from them by major
oil companies without just cause.

78%

22%

44%

45%

11%

b) Do you believe that it offers you sufficient
protection?

39%

57%

8%

c) Do you believe that further legislation is
necessary to protect your business? If yes,
what kind would you like?

a) Do you believe that this bill is necessary
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65

35%

57%

J3%_

8.

Do .you anticipate future encroachment on the
part of a major oil company threatening your
independence?

9%

85%

6%

y.

Do your experiences justify this concern?
If so, please explain.

43%

53%

4%

10.

Do you believe that there ''truly" was a
shortage of gasoline during 1973-1974?

74%__

26%

11.

Is there presently a shortage of gasoline?

44%

52%

12.

Do you foresee a shortage in the future?

6%

94%

13.

Are you able to obtain all of the gasoline
that you need?

7%

93%

14.

Do you now have difficulty obtaining an ade
quate supply of gasoline?

43%

57%

15.

Are you a bulk dealer?

16.

Please list your sources of supply of gasoline.

4%

[Of those replying, 54% gave their brand name,
20% id not reply and 36% either listed several
sources or responded by identifying the supplier
as a "major."
17.

Did you have difficulty in obtaining supplies
of gasoline in

11%

89%

a) 1972?

52%

48%

b) 1973?

37%

63%

c) 1974?
18.

Have you received supplies of gasoline from
your usual sources only? If sources were
different, please list them.
[Sources included the Federal Energy Office,
major brand companies, independent companies
and Canadian companies.]

27%

73%

18%

82%

—

19.

Was the allocation program instituted in
January, 1974 vital to your business?

20.

Do you favor a continuation of the allocation
program? If yes, please explain why you favor
a continuation.
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21.

17 %
22 %
26%
24%
11%

During the winter of 1974 approximately what
percent of adjusted base allocation of gaso
line did you receive? Please check appro
priate response.
More than your 1972 base allocation
100% of your 1972 base allocation
90% of your 1972 base allocation
85% of your 1972 base allocation
Less than 85% of your 1972 base allocation

22.

Is your station required to offer the follow
ing additonal services that would not have
been introduced voluntarily to increase
gasoline sales?

4%

89%

7%

24 hour service

15%

78%

7%

car wash

9%

84%

7%

bonus gifts

0%

93%

7%

stamps

4%

8%

88%

other
23.

2%

Please check the appropriate response.
In the past five years has your business
become
substantially less profitable

16%

less profitable

54%

more profitable
considerably more profitable or

0%
28%

remained about the same
24.

If your business has become more profitable
please number in order of importance those
items that have contributed to this profitabi1ity.
[Iri this case, 69% reported increasing profit
ability, 9% said business was less profitable,
and 22% did not reply. Many of the replies
were not numbered in order of importance and
those that were numbered varied as to the
importance of the factors listed. However,
the increase in the price of gasoline and
absence of gas wars were generally more
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significant than the other factors. Of those
respondents who indicated that business was
less profitable, only two dealers attributed
their difficulties to a lack of supply of
gasoline. ]
Increased automation
Increase in the price of gasoline
Increase in gasoline sales
Expanding service department
Increase in sales of staple items
Improved or expanded facilities
Absence of gas wars
Decrease in the number of service stations in
your area
Availability of a good labor supply
or
If your business is less profitable, please
number in order of importance those items
that have contributed to a decrease in
profitability.
Inadequate availability of labor
Lack of supply of gasoline
Failure to expand service department
Deterioration of facilities
Increase in the number of service stations in
your area
Over expansion of facilities
Government regulations
25.

31 %

more profitable
less profitable
remain about the same

22 %
m

87%

Please check the appropriate response. In terms
of the rate of return on your investment do
you believe your business will become

13%

26.

Are you concerned that increasing profit
ability of your business will encourage
major oil companies to encroach on your
independence?

27.

Please check the appropriate response. Do you
believe that the present government regulations
for major oil companies should
2%
28%

be abolished

35%

remain the same

decrease somewhat
24% increase somewhat

7 % increase substantially

4%__no response
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28.

Please check the appropriate response.
Do you believe that the present government
regulations for independent service
stations should

33%

be abolished

15%

decrease somewhat

44%

remain the same

4%

increase somewhat

4%

increase substantially
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